AN OVERVIEW OF ASIAN COMPANIES: SURINAME
90% of Suriname is under forest cover, totalling about 14,835,000 hectares out of total territory of 16,382,000 hectares. By the early 1990s a total area of well over 2 million hectares of natural forest, all in the north of the country - the so called 'Forestry Belt' - was under exploitation and most of this has now been subjected to at least one logging cycle.
According to a 1990 report, timber harvesting in Suriname could "no longer be considered to be a light forest creaming followed by a recovery period for re-growth of desirable species. It has become a capital-intensive operation, the cost of which has to be recovered by raising output. Accessible natural forests are [now] under pressure to yield a maximum quantity of un-usable wood. The emphasis on maximising production is a potential threat to the forest".
Logging practices in Suriname were characterised 'as a type of mining operation', that is to say the logging was unsustainable. (Sizer & Rice, 1995)
In the early 1990s, with foreign technical assistance, the Government revised its forestry legislation and a fully modernised Forestry Act was published in 1992. The Act established a clear basis for restricting all timber harvesting to that carried out under proper management regimes. Under the Forestry Act, forests may only be open to exploitation once an inventory has been made of the timber in the concession area and a proper management plan has been drawn up. Only on acceptance of this plan should a felling license be given out. The Act provides the basis for the application of more detailed regulations stipulating the species, sizes and volumes of timbers that may be extracted. The Act also places clear ceilings on the size of concessions. Normally concessions will be limited to 5,000 hectares per concessionaire but can be increased to 150,000 hectares for operators with proper sawmills.
Exceptionally, 150,000 hectare concessions may be allocated to 'integrated' timber industries. No concessions may be handed out to companies that cannot prove that they are financially secure and possess the required skills to carry out the management plans.
The Act also protects 'the common law rights of the inhabitants of the interior living in tribes in their villages and settle- ments as well as their agricultural plots, as much as possible' (Colchester, 1995).
There are however, attempts to reverse the Forest Act. The present government's proposal to reverse the previous policy decision and open the hill forests to foreign companies has caused an international furore (Time, 1994). Few if any of the legal provisions above have been applied and political pressures are now conspiring to subvert them completely. The civil war and simultaneous economic collapse in Suriname have dealt serious blows to the capacity of the Forestry Service to oversee logging in the interior. The service now has just four professional foresters and about ten secondary level forest rangers and lost nearly all its vehicles and forest camps in the civil war. With only two jeeps and a couple of motorised canoes the service is now too strapped for cash to venture into the forests. As a result, some 30% of timber cutting is undeclared and up to 15% of logs are smuggled out through neighbouring Guyana and French Guyana. (Colchester, 1995)
Only about 6% of the forests within the Forestry Service's area of operation were considered to be 'managed' or 'partly managed'. (Sizer & Rice, 1995) New forest ordinances were passed which provided for a system of managed concessions aimed at sustained production, although the estimated rate of forest regeneration of 2 m3/ha per annum of commercial species was absurdly high. The Forestry Service however, did not move to reduce the allowable cuts even though the forests were in fact being over-harvested.
It should be noted that as early as the 1970s Government foresters were fully appraised of the very slow rates at which merchantable timbers would regenerate in the Forestry Belt and realised that exploitation in the much more vulnerable and even slower growing upland forests deeper in the interior was likely to be both environmentally risky and unsustainable (Sizer & Rice, 1995).Logging companies have sought out political patrons to gain concessions on favourable terms. Fees paid by concessionaires are fixed and have been eroded by inflation to almost nothing. There are three main fees: i) area fees of U$0.02 per hectare per year; ii) royalty of U$ 0.005 - U$ 0.02 per log; and iii) export taxes of 5% to 10% of 'free on board' value.
The race to gain logging concessions was first lead by a locally-incorporated Indonesian company calling itself MUSA Indo-Suriname which, in March 1993, indicated a willingness to invest an improbable US$ 1.5 billion in Suriname in exchange for a timber concession of 5 million hectares - a move that would at a stroke have tripled the area of forest in the country allocated to timber extraction. The offer was welcomed by Suriname's politicians who that same month had reached an impasse in their negotiations with the Dutch Government and European Union over the terms for future development assistance. (Sizer & Rice, 1995)
Suriname is under pressure from the International Monetary Fund to sell its forest resources. Internal political factors, which according to Ernie Bruning, an outspoken member of the Surinamese parliament, include bribery, in a country where parliamentarians earn only a few dollars a month, have further confounded moves to bring structure to the forestry sector. Inter-American Bank President Enrique Iglesias was so concerned that he personally raised the issue with the Surinamese President Ronald Venetiaan. (Colchester, 1995).
FOREIGN LOGGING CONCESSIONS
In response of Suriname�s invitation to Asian investors to explore logging possibilities in the country, at least five proposal were received - one from a Malaysian gambling tycoon, two from Indonesian logging consortia and two from state-owned Chinese enterprises - most of these with unenviable histories of disregarding social and environmental concerns. Total investments proposed are over U$ 500 million (not far short of Suriname�s Gross Domestic Product), and somewhere between three and five million hectares, or 25 - 44%, of the country's land area could be logged. (Sizer, 1995)
The three companies named below are all reported to have initially applied for logging concessions in interior forests covering 1,250,000 ha, with roundwood production between 490-664,000 m3. Proposed investments range from US$ 78-149 million.
BERJAYA TIMBER INDUSTRIES SURINAME N. V.
Since late 1994, Berjaya has been pressing the Suriname Government to grant the company a one million hectares timber concession in the South-eastern part of the country. A significant part of the proposed Berjaya concession covers indigenous people's land
.
Berjaya's provisional contract was partially revised in 1995 after massive national and international opposition. Revisions included excising strips of land along the rivers from the concession to give more protection to the Maroon and indigenous communities in the area. (Colchester, 1995. p91.) Other clauses in the contracts now refer to the recognition of areas of "alloidal ownership and heredity ownership" as exempt from logging. According to Colchester (1995), there has been no attempt to map these areas and it will probably be a battle for each community to get its customary rights recognised as the logging continues.
Not satisfied with their situation, the Amerindians and the Maroon tribe which live in the concession area have created a political party to oppose the Berjaya logging venture. The recently formed Suriname Democratic Party said in a statement that the people of the interior will not accept the contracts in their present form. (FT, 1996a) One member of parliament is reported as saying to the Washington Post that 'bribery is rampant and welcome because parliamentarians only make a few dollars a month'. Berjaya is said to have put the brother of Suriname's Foreign Minister in charge of its local operations, thereby gaining the Minister's support. (RAN, 1995)
The Dutch and US Governments and the World Bank have also expressed reservations about the contract. Concern has also been expressed that, like MUSA in central Suriname (see above), Berjaya may negotiate contracts with the village captains to gain access to timber on village lands with the same social consequences.(Colchester, 1995)
N.V. MITRA USAHA SEJATI ABADI (MUSA)INDOSURINAME
MUSA is thought to be a consortium of about eighteen Indonesian companies (Sizer & Rice, 1995, p11). The NGO Network for Forest Conservation in Indonesia (SKEPHI) identified four members of the MUSA venture as : Porodisa Trading, Pacific Bontang Raya Industry, Putera Bengalun Wood, Meratus Kalimantan Timber (all based in East Kalimantan , Indonesia), and Tembaru Budi Pratama (North Sulawesi). (SKEPHI, 1997)
Porodisa Trading is connected to a number of Indonesian companies which are managed by a small group of families, headed by Mr Budiman Imoek. MUSA operations in Suriname are managed by Mr. Irawan Imoek, the son of Mr. Budiman Imoek (SKEPHI, 1997). In 1991 the Indonesian Ministry of Forests imposed supervisory management by state forest companies on dozens of companies, including Meratus Kaltim (which is connected to Porodisa) and in 1993 Porodisa itself "...owing to their systematic abuse of Indonesian forestry regulations..." (Ministry of Forests quoted in the Jakarta Post, 1/8/94). MUSA, unlike the other prospective investors, has been operating since 1993. MUSA managed to obtain rights of 150,000 hectares in the Apura district in West Suriname, without the approval of Suriname�s parliament. According to an Indonesian independent journalist's bulletin, Suara Independent, Musa�s investment approval was obtained after visits to Indonesia by Surinam�s Minister for Social Affairs, Willy Soemita, who is of Javanese origin. A subsequent visit of Suriname�s president, Mr Venetiaan, to Indonesia in 1994, had established a 20 years co-operation agreement between Indonesia and Suriname in the field of forestry. Officially MUSA was granted only 150,000 hectares, the maximum areas permitted under the 1992 Forest Management Act and the company claims to have invested more than US$ 20 million. However, MUSA's ongoing operation in Suriname has repeatedly come under fire in local and international press. Recent accusations in the press in Suriname centre on massive illegal logging outside the concession area and pay-offs to community leaders aimed at by-passing logging authorities. Other attempts at evading forestry legislation include establishing 67 subsidiary companies in Suriname to obtain a large number of small concessions rather than applying for a single large and politically controversial one.
Upon being questioned over the issue by Indonesian officials, Porodisa (see below) indicated that Mr Willy Sumita, Suriname's former Minister for Social Affairs, had engineered the shadow companies (SKEPHI, 1997).
MUSA has been said to lack any clear structure or system of management. Hence, forestry operations are not based upon proper forest surveys and forest management plans. In so far as forest management is employed, the principal on which it is based has been described as that of "the flying bulldozer brigade". MUSA has also been reported as having illegally logged part of the CELOS experimental forestry management plots managed by the University of Suriname (SKEPHI, 1997).
SURI-ATLANTIC INDUSTRIES N.V.
The ultimate ownership of Suri-Atlantic is not clear. Isitan International Limited and Yan Right Holdings Limited are listed in the British Virgin Islands while diplomatic sources in Paramaribo say the company gives its ultimate owners as PT Gudang Garam and PT Antang Permai Plywood (Colchester, 1995). Other sources name three Indonesian companies: P.T. Tritama Unggulestari, P.T. Antang Perrnai Plywood Industry, and P.T. Pelayran Utamalestari Bahari, all based in Banjamarsin, South Kalimantan, Indonesia (Sizer & Rice, 1995) as being the owners. According to The Australian�s "Asia Billionares" list , Rachaman Halim (Gudang Garam�s heir CEO) and the Wonowidjojo family are the seveth richest family in Asia, with an estimate wealth of U$ 7.7 billion. (The Australian, Feb 6, 1997).
BELIZE
The Malaysian logging company, Atlantic Industries, has started logging operations near the village of Santa Anna, in Belize. The Government has granted a logging concession on Belize's ancestral Maya lands without consulting the local people. The local Audubon Society claimed that Atlantic Industries was illegally cutting down protected sapodillas - the "chicle" trees once harvested heavily for their sap, a substitute for rubber and later the main ingredient in chewing gum. The group also charged the loggers for cutting within a 20-meter restricted zone along streams, which can cause massive erosion of banks. Villagers from Canejo, about 10 miles downstream, were without drinking water last year when logging operations near streams filled the headwaters of the Temash River with mud. Logging violations are frequent, local villagers say, not only because there are so few government monitors but also because some firms disguise the size of the lands they actually control. They reported that Atlantic Industries logs and controls several areas outside of its won 24,000-acre lease, including a 159,000- acre neighbouring concession and at least two other large plots of land that total 30,000 acres. In 1995, the company approached Belize�s forestry department with a proposal to log in the uncut rain forest of the country�s southern Toledo district. A report by the government's technical forestry consultant was highly critical: "It clearly lacks professional preparation and analysis," wrote Neil Bird, the consultant, "It is not something one would expect from an investor who is preparing to invest U$ 1.8 million in a timber operation. .I have serious doubts about the credibility of this company." Yet, despite that unfavourable recommendation and warnings from the forestry department, the transaction was pushed through in April 1995. ( US news Magazine, March 1997).
